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On May 30, 2011, President Ma Ying-joeu of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) attended the opening ceremony of the 2011 
International Law Association (ILA) Asia-Pacific Regional 
Conference held in Taipei, Taiwan. In his welcome address, President 
Ma advocated the concept of “mutual non-denial” as an effective 
approach to handle complex and sensitive cross-strait relations.1 
Why did he say that? Observers generally agreed that Dr. Ma 
Ying-jeou’s inauguration as president of the Republic of China in 
May 2008 signified a significant change in the Taiwan’s Mainland 
China policy. 2  Since then, seven meetings of Straits Exchange 
Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan and the Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in mainland China have been 
held and have produced 16 agreements. 3  In addition to making 
 
† Professor, Department of Diplomacy and Department of Law, National Chengchi 
University, Taipei, Republic of China (Taiwan). This article is dedicated to my mentor, 
Professor Hungdah Chiu, a great teacher, who taught students so many things, and cared for 
them so much. This is why we respect him, appreciate him, and cherish all those good 
memories. We owe much to him. 
 1. Ma Ying-jeou, President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Address at the 2011 
International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference (May 30, 2001), available 
at http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24496&rmid=2355. 
 2. E.g., KERRY DUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22853, TAIWAN’S 2008 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 3–6 (2008); Tang Shaocheng, Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: A 
New Era (UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 21, 2009). See generally Donald S. Zagoria, 
Cross-Strait Relations: Cautious Optimism (National Comm. on Am. Foreign Policy, 2009), 
available at http://ncafp.org/articles/09%20cross%20strait%20relations-%20cautious 
%20optimism.pdf. 
 3. For a comprehensive list of the cross-strait agreements from 1990 to 2009 and 
translated texts of such agreements, see Pasha L. Hsieh & Pei-Lun Tsai, Special Report: 
Cross-Strait Agreements: 1990-2009, 27 Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 164, 164–
227. For a comprehensive list of cross-strait meetings, see Li Ci Hui Tan Zong Lan (歷次會
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regular and direct air travel between the two sides possible, the SEF-
ARATS negotiations also finalized the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) to reduce cross-strait trade barriers. 
From Taiwan’s perspective, these promising developments have 
proven that mutual non-denial is a workable model for maintaining 
peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.4  
This article will analyze mutual non-denial within the context of 
cross-strait relations in memory of Professor Hungdah Chiu, who 
advocated the concept of mutual non-denial since the 1990s. The 
state of relations between Mainland China and Taiwan5  and their 
relevance to international law and affairs have always interested 
scholars and practitioners around the world and much has been 
written on issues such as the One-China principle, the legal status of 
the Republic of China (ROC), and its territory sovereignty.6 Thus, 
mutual non-denial as a cornerstone of President Ma’s mainland China 
policy is certainly worthy of further discussion. 
Part I of this article provides a brief background on the evolution 
of cross-strait relations from 1949 to present and part II analyzes 
mutual non-denial, with reference to considerations in the ROC’s 
domestic laws. Part III reviews the post World War II experiences of 
East and West German relations and international law to search for 
precedents for the concept of mutual non-denial. Finally, implications 
 
談總覽) [Overview of Previous Talks], HAI XIA JIAO LIU JI JIN HUI (海峽交流基金會) 
[STRAITS EXCH. FOUND.], http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4306&CtUnit=2541 
&BaseDSD=21&mp=19 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 4. See Ma Ying-Jeou, supra note 1. 
 5. In this article, the terms “Taiwan” and “ROC”, as well as the terms “Mainland 
China” and “PRC” will be used interchangeably. Cross-strait relations, instead of ROC-PRC 
relations, is used here in order to avoid reference to sovereignty disputes. 
 6. See Björn Ahl, Taiwan, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L., 
http://www.mpepil.com/ (follow “List of Articles by Author” hyperlink; then follow “Ahl, 
Björn” hyperlink; then follow “Taiwan” hyperlink) (providing a select bibliography). See 
generally James R. Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); 
Jonathan I. Charney & J. R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between China and 
Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453 (2000); Chi Chung, International Law and the Extraordinary 
Interaction between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan, 
19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 233 (2009); Augusto Hernández-Campos, The Criteria of 
Statehood in International Law and the Hallstein Doctrine: The Case of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan, 24 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 75 (2006); Pasha L. Hsieh, An 
Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: The Case of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765 (2007) [hereinafter Hsieh, Unrecognized State]; Pasha 
L. Hsieh, The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed 
Momentum, 84 DIE FRIDENS-WARTE: J. INT’L PEACE & ORG. 59 (2009) [hereinafter Hsieh, 
Taiwan Question]; Tzu-wen Lee, The International Legal Status of Republic of China on 
Taiwan, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN. AFF. 351 (1996). 
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of mutual non-denial to cross-strait relations and international law are 
discussed in Part IV. 
I. CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: 1949 TO PRESENT 
Cross-strait relations can be divided into three eras: 1895 to 
1945, 1945 to 1949, and 1949 to the present.7 From 1895 to 1945, 
Taiwan was part of the Japanese empire due to a Qing dynasty 
concession ceding Taiwan to the Empire of Japan under the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki in 1895.8 From 1945 to 1949, Taiwan and the Chinese 
mainland were under the sovereignty of the Republic of China 
(ROC).9 After losing the Chinese Civil War to the Communist Party 
of China in 1949, the ROC government retreated from the Chinese 
mainland to Taiwan. Today, the ROC government effectively 
governs the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores and the islands of 
Kinmen and Matsu. 10  The ROC’s Constitution asserts a claim to 
sovereignty over all of China, and the ROC government maintains 
that it has never unequivocally asserted that Taiwan is an independent 
state.11 
Before October 25, 1971 most western nations and the United 
Nations regarded the ROC government as the sole legitimate 
government of China. However, in 1971 the UN General Assembly 
voted to give China’s seat in the United Nations to the People’s 
 
 7. Hsieh, Taiwan Question, supra note 6, at 60–61. 
 8. Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki stipulated: “China cedes to Japan in 
perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, 
arsenals, and public property thereon: . . . (b) The island of Formosa, together with all 
islands appertaining or belonging to the said island . . . .” CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE 214 
(Hungdah Chiu ed., 1979) (reprinting the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Cession of Taiwan)). See 
also Ahl, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
 9. Hungdag Chiu, The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations, in CHINA AND 
THE TAIWAN ISSUE, supra note 8, at 148. 
 10. For general geographical information on Taiwan, see GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
OFFICE, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 17–18 (2011), available at http://www.gio.gov. 
tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/docs/ch01.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., MINGUO XIANFA art. 4 (1947) (Taiwan) (“The territory of the Republic of 
China within its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by a resolution of 
the National Assembly.”); Jason Hu, Evolution of Concepts and Principles of Contemporary 
International Law: The ROC as a Case Study, 16 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 
80, 80–87 (1998) (discussing the ROC’s quasi-state status under international law); Ma 
Ying-jeou, supra note 1 (distinguishing between the ROC’s “constitutional sovereignty” 
over mainland China and its authority to govern there); Crawford, supra note 6, at 217 
(distinguishing “between the validity of the grant of independence to a State, and the validity 
of its constitution”). 
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Republic of China (PRC).12 Since then, most states have recognized 
the PRC and severed formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
Indeed, as of 2011, only 23 sovereign States have official diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan.13 In 1979, the United States also recognized 
the PRC government to be the sole de jure government of China.14 
Under such circumstances, issues surrounding Taiwan’s participation 
in international organizations and its treatment in both diplomatic 
relations and domestic courts have become among the most enduring 
problems in international law.15  
In its 2000 white paper on the One China Principle and Taiwan 
issues, the PRC government states that the Taiwan question is by 
definition an internal Chinese affair, 16  contending that the ROC 
government ceased to be the legitimate government of China after its 
retreat to Taiwan in 1949.17 Beginning in 2002, Beijing started to 
claim both sides of the Taiwan Straits as part of China.18 However, 
the PRC continues to assert the right to use force against Taiwan if it 
declares independence.19 In the international arena, the PRC requires 
states to give no recognition to the ROC as a condition of maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC also opposes Taiwan’s 
efforts to accede to international organizations.20 This is a situation 
 
 12. See G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429, at 2 
(Oct. 25, 1971). 
 13. Diplomatic Allies, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN), 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Regions/AlliesIndex/?opno=f8505044-f8dd-4fc9-b5b5-
0da9d549c9794&mp=6 (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). Many States have developed substitutes 
for diplomatic relations to maintain quasi-official bilateral relations with Taiwan. Relations 
between the United States and Taiwan are conducted through the American Institute in 
Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States. 
See Hungdah Chiu, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised 
Version), OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINT SER. CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., no. 5, 1992, at 1, 19–
22 [hereinafter Hungdah Chiu, Legal Status]. 
 14. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United 
States of America and the People’s Republic of China January 1, 1979, 79 DEP’T ST. BULL. 
25, 25 (1979), reprinted in 18 ILM 274 (1979). 
 15. For a description of how foreign courts regard the sovereignty of Taiwan, see Hsieh, 
Unrecognized State, supra note 6, at 773. 
 16. Fan Fen Lie Guo Jia Fa (反分裂国家法) [Anti-Secession Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2005, effective Mar. 14, 2005), arts. 2–3 
(Lawinfochina) (China).  
 17. E.g., Taiwan Affairs Office & Info. Office of the State Council, The One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000), GOV.CN (Feb. 2000), http://english.gov.cn/official/ 
2005-07/27/content_17613.htm. 
 18. Tan Shaocheng, A Comparison between Intra-German Relations in the 1970s and 
Cross-Strait Relations Since 2008, 46 ISSUES & STUD. 1, 10 (2010). 
 19. Anti-Secession Law, art. 8. 
 20. See, e.g., Ahl, supra note 6, ¶¶ 23–25. 
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similar to the Hallstein Doctrine in Germany, wherein the 
government of West Germany announced that it would not establish 
or maintain diplomatic relations with any country that recognized 
East Germany during the 1950s and 1960s.21 The Hallstein Doctrine 
was replaced in 1969 by Chancellor Willy Brandt’s new doctrine of 
Ostpolitik which promoted reconciliation between West Germany 
and East Germany.22  
Before 1979, the PRC adhered to the policy of “liberating” 
Taiwan, while Taiwan pursued a policy of “recovering” the 
Mainland. During that period, the two sides advocated the use of 
force to achieve Chinese unification.23 Since the early 1980s, tensions 
between Taiwan and Mainland China has relaxed. Both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits have moved rapidly toward closer relations in the 
cultural, social, trade, and investment areas.24 Those closer relations 
necessitated contacts between Taiwan and Mainland China. To 
facilitate relations, both sides created semi-official organizations to 
deal with cross-strait affairs. Taiwan created the SEF and the PRC 
created the ARATS. On April 29, 1993, three agreements and a joint 
accord were signed between Chairman Koo Chen-fu of the SEF and 
Chairman Wang Tao-han of ARATS.25  
Since the beginning of negotiations between the SEF and the 
ARATS, “the One-China principle” has been a sensitive issue for 
Taiwan and Mainland China. Mainland China has consistently 
insisted on the One-China principle as a precondition for cross-strait 
talks. Taiwan is unwilling to explicitly agree to this principle because 
most countries in the world have recognized the PRC as the sole legal 
 
 21. See Tan Shaocheng, supra note 18, at 4–5; Augusto Hernández-Campos, supra note 
6, at 82–83; Thomas D. Grant, Hallstein Revisited: Unilateral Enforcement of Regimes of 
Nonrecognition Since the Two Germanies, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 221, 223 (2000). Named after 
Walter Hallstein, State Secretary for Foreign Affaris of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), the Hallstein Doctrine refers to the foreign policy of West Germany to not 
recognize or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany). Id. at 225. 
 22. See Augusto Hernández-Campos, supra note 6, at 84.  
 23. Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and 
Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents), 29 ISSUES & STUD. 1, 2–3 
(1993) [hereinafter Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang]. 
 24. Recent Relations Between China and Taiwan Since 1993: Hearing on the Growth of 
the Chinese Military and its Threat to Taiwan Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of 
Hungdah Chiu) reprinted in Hungdah Chiu & June Teufel Dreyer, Recent Relations Between 
China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS 
SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., no. 3, 1996 at, 2, 2. 
 25. Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang, supra note 23, at 14–15. 
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government of China and inserting the One-China principle into the 
proposed agreement could create the impression that the ROC was 
submitting to the PRC’s sovereignty.26  
To circumvent these political differences, the two sides reached 
the “one-China, but different interpretations,” understanding, in Hong 
Kong in 1992. This later became known as the “92 Consensus.”27 To 
Beijing, one China means the People’s Republic of China; to Taipei, 
one China means the Republic of China.28 
The 92 Consensus has been the cornerstone of the ROC 
government Mainland policy since 2008, providing the political 
framework to uphold the ROC’s sovereignty. Following the 92 
Consensus, Taiwan’s mutual non-denial further reaffirmed and 





 26. Id. at 10. 
 27. SU CHI, TAIWAN’S RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA: A TAIL WAGGING TWO DOGS 
14 (2009). 
 28. On August 1, 1992, the ROC’s National Unification Council adopted a resolution on 
the meaning of “one China” as follows: 
First, both of the Taiwan Straits have been adhering to the principle of one 
China. Nevertheless, the positions of the two sides are somewhat different. The 
Chinese Communists, for example, contend that one China means the People’s 
Republic of China and that, after reunification in the future, Taiwan will 
become a special administrative region under the jurisdiction of the Chinese 
Communists. Meanwhile, our side contends that one China means the Republic 
of China founded in 1912 and [its] sovereignty cover all of China. Our 
government’s current political power, however, only covers Taiwan, Penghu, 
Chinmen [Quemoy] and Matsu. Taiwan is a part of China and the mainland is 
also part of China. 
 Second, since the 38th year of the Republic of China [1949], China 
entered a temporary division and two political entities have ruled the two sides 
of the Taiwan Straits since then. This is an objective fact. All views on unifying 
the country must not overlook the existence of this fact. 
 Third, to develop the nation and promote the nation’s prosperity and the 
people’s welfare, the Government of the Republic of China has formulated a 
program for national reunification. It also has sought a common understanding 
among all people, and it has implemented steps to promote the reunification of 
the country. Therefore, it earnestly hopes that the authorities on the mainland 
will seek truth from facts, discard preconceived ideas, cooperate with us, and 
contribute to the building of a free, democratic, commonly rich, and single 
China.  
Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang, supra note 23, at 10–11 (alteration in original). 
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II. THE MUTUAL NON-DENIAL APPROACH 
A.  General Concept  
But what is the mutual non-denial approach? In tracing the 
origin of mutual non-denial one invariably finds Professor Hungdah 
Chiu, who as a member of the research committee of the National 
Unification Council (NUC), was one of the leading experts who 
designed and developed the concept of mutual non-denial. In 1991, 
the NUC adopted the Guidelines for National Unification stating “in 
the midst of exchanges and not denying the other’s existence as a 
political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.” 29  The 
wording of “not denying the other’s” reflected the same spirit of 
President Ma’s mutual non-denial, although the Guidelines for 
National Unification emphasized “not denying the other’s existence 
as a political entity,” while President Ma insisted upon “not denying 
each other’s authority to govern.”30  
According to President Ma, mutual non-denial means “mutual 
non-recognition,” i.e., “the two sides [of the Taiwan Straits] do not 
recognize each other’s sovereignty, nor do they deny each other’s 
authority to govern.” He further explained why Taiwan and Mainland 
China cannot recognize each other’s sovereignty: 
Under the ROC constitutional framework, the cross-strait 
relationship is not one between states, but a special 
relationship for which the model of recognition under 
conventional international law is not applicable. Therefore, 
we cannot and do not recognize mainland China’s 
sovereignty, nor should we or do we deny its authority to 
govern mainland China.31 
Therefore, the Taiwan-Mainland China case is clearly a case of 
mutual non-recognition of sovereignty. And the term “authority to 
govern” reflects the fact that Taiwan and the Mainland can in reality 
exercise power to govern persons and property by its domestic law 
based upon effective control of territory.32 In that sense, “authority to 
 
 29. Guidelines for National Unification (adopted by the Nat’l Unification Council on 
Feb. 23, 1991 and by the Executive Yuan Council on Mar. 14, 1991), available at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ (search for “guidelines for national unification” and then follow the 
second result). 
 30. See Ma Ying-Jeou, supra note 1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. For the summary of various views of scholars on this question, see Hungdah Chiu, 
Legal Status, supra note 13, at 7–14. 
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govern” is broader than the international law concept of jurisdiction, 
which includes both the power to prescribe rules and the power to 
enforce them.33 In addition, “authority to govern” also means Taiwan 
and Mainland China may treat each other on a de facto basis as an 
entity without touching the issue of recognition.  
On the advantages of mutual non-denial, President Ma noted: 
“Mutual non-denial” of one another’s authority to govern, 
however, is a practical recognition of the status quo. 
Otherwise, the negotiation and signing of 15 legally 
binding agreements between the two sides would not have 
been possible. Only through “mutual non-denial” can cross-
strait relations continue moving forward peacefully. 
Therefore, I see “mutual non-recognition and mutual non-
denial” as the best interpretation of the cross-strait status 
quo and also the best approach to addressing realities, 
shelving disputes, and promoting peace.34 
Mutual non-denial has been effective in moving Taiwan and 
Mainland China toward closer cultural, social, trade, and investment 
ties. For example, from December 15, 2008 to November 21, 2010, 
over 7.85 million trips were made through direct flights across the 
strait; from July 2008 to the end of November 2010, over 1.74 
million Mainland tourists visited Taiwan.35 Since the “Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance” 
came into effect on June 25, 2009, the two sides have established 
mechanisms to share judicial documents, “conducted investigations 
and gathered evidence, and assisted with arrest and repatriation in 
over 11,200 cases.” 36  Notably, 70 criminals accused of fraud, 
kidnapping, drug crimes, and robbery were repatriated under the 
agreement.37 
But one other significant advantage of this approach is that it 
does not alter the ROC’s status quo in international law as well as 
international relations. For a time, the ROC refused to maintain 
 
 33. DAVID HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 228 (7th ed. 2010). 
 34. See Ma Ying-jeou, supra note 1. 
 35. Opening Up and Guarding the Country Benefits of the 14 Cross-Strait Agreements, 
MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL 6 (Dec. 2010), http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/11199 
164471.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 13.  
 37. Id. 
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diplomatic relations with any state recognizing the PRC. 38  That 
policy, however, has been changed and Taiwan has abandoned its 
policy of intolerance of bi-lateral recognition of the PRC.39 The ROC 
no longer competes with the PRC for the right to represent all of 
China,40 but it can still exercise its own foreign relations powers and 
enter into international agreements with other states. To the United 
States and other countries which have recognized the PRC, there is 
no pressure for them to re-recognize the ROC. For the 23 states 
maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC, their recognition 
appears to be more beneficial to their development if cross-strait 
relations are peaceful. With respect to participation in international 
organizations, it will be possible for Taiwan to bind its territory as a 
party to various conventions.41  
B.   The Legal Foundations of Mutual Non-Denial  
The ROC’s Constitution, domestic legislation, and 
Constitutional Court’s interpretations clearly support the essence of 
mutual non-denial. The ROC was established on January 1, 1912. 
Between 1912 and 1945, various versions of the constitution were 
drafted and enacted, but it was not until December 25, 1946 that the 
constitution was adopted by the elected National Assembly. On 
December 25, 1947, the present ROC Constitution entered into 
force. 42  Under the 1947 ROC Constitution, both Taiwan and the 
Mainland are parts of the ROC. 
In 1948, considering the full-scale civil war had been continuing 
for some time, the National Assembly amended the Constitution to 
adopt “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of 
Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion,” which 
granted extraordinary powers to the President, and suspended 
elections for the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the 
Control Yuan. 43  In 1949, the ROC’s loss to Chinese communist 
forces in the Chinese civil war ended operation of the ROC 
 
 38. JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 257–59 (1974). 
 39. Grant, supra note 21, at 231.  
 40. See Charney & Prescott, supra note 6, at 464 (citing 1994 ROC Mainland China 
Council’s position). 
 41. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 219–20. 
 42. See Hungdah Chiu, Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., no. 2, 1993, at 1, 
5–14 (discussing constitutional development in the Republic of China on Taiwan). 
 43. Id. at 14–16. 
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Constitution in Mainland China, but it has remained in force in 
Taiwan.  
On May 1, 1991, the “Period of Mobilization for the Suppression 
of Communist Rebellion” and the “Temporary Provisions” of the 
Constitution were terminated as the beginning of a process of 
implementing constitutional reform.44 Additional articles have been 
added to the 1947 ROC Constitution (1991 Additional Articles),45 
because enacting a new Constitution only applicable to Taiwan 
would imply Taiwanese independence.  
The 1991 Additional Articles are revisions to the original ROC 
Constitution, which was enacted in 1947 when the ROC still 
governed Mainland China. Its effect is that the territory of Mainland 
China is still treated as territory of the ROC.46 In doing so, the 1991 
Additional Articles describe the ROC as comprised of two areas: the 
“free area” and the “mainland area.”47 Recognizing the reality of the 
PRC and envisaging that cross-strait relations may be regulated by 
special laws, the 1991 Additional Articles authorize the government 
to enact a law to regulate relations on interchanges between Taiwan 
and Mainland China. Article 11 of the Additional Articles provides 
that “The relationship of rights and obligations between the people of 
the mainland China and those of the free area, and the disposition of 
other affairs shall be specially regulated by law.”48 
That is why the Act Governing Relations between the People of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (Cross-Strait Statute) was 
enacted. Passed by the Legislative Yuan in 1992, the Cross-Strait 
Statute governs the relations between the people of Taiwan and the 
Mainland, covering administrative, civic, and criminal matters arising 
from cross-strait interactions. 49  The Statute defines the “Taiwan 
Area” as the ROC government that exercises its effective control50 
and the “Mainland Area” as the ROC territory outside the Taiwan 
 
 44. Id. at 32.  
 45. Id. at 31.  
 46. See MINGUO XIANFA art. 4 (1947) (Taiwan).  
 47. See Article 11 of the 1991 Additional Articles, MINGUO XIANFA (1947) (Taiwan). 
See also Hsieh, Taiwan Question, supra note 6, at 67. 
 48. See Article 11 of the 1991 Additional Articles, MINGUO XIANFA (1947) (Taiwan). 
 49. See Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang, supra note 23, at 6. 
 50. This includes Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and any other area under the 
effective control of the ROC government. See Act Governing Relations between the People 
of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, art. 2 (Aug. 2004) (including Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen, Matsu, and any other area under the effective control of the ROC government), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/43a2945d4.pdf. 
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Area. The statute also lays down a conflict of laws rule applicable to 
civil matters between the Mainland and Taiwan.51 
The Constitutional Court of the ROC also found opportunities to 
address the problem of relations between Taiwan and Mainland 
China. The Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution with 
respect to matters relating to uncertainties regarding the application 
of the Constitution, the constitutionality of laws or orders, and the 
constitutionality of local government laws.52 In 1993, the Court was 
requested to determine the outer boundaries of the national territory 
of the ROC. In interpretation no. 328, the Constitutional Court 
avoided the issue and asserted that: 
Instead of enumerating the components, Article 4 of the 
Constitution provides that the national territory of the 
Republic of China is determined “according to its existing 
national boundaries.” Based on political and historical 
reasons, a special procedure is also required for any change 
of territory. The delimitation of national territory according 
to its history is a significant political question and thus it is 
beyond the reach of judicial review.53 
Immediately after interpretation no. 328, the Court was 
requested to decide whether four agreements between Chairman Koo 
Chen-fu of Taipei’s SEF and Chairman Wang Tao-han of Beijing’s 
ARATS were “international agreements.” 54  The Court in 
Interpretation no. 329 held that they were not.55 Article 11 of the 
1991 Additional Articles and legislation enacted under it do not deny 
the reality of the PRC on the Mainland Area, but the ROC on Taiwan 
cannot recognize the PRC because, based upon its constitution and 
 
 51. Chi Chung, supra note 6, at 236. 
 52. See Petitions and Procedures for Interpretation, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT, JUDICIAL YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p02_01_01.asp 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 53. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 328, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 
JUDICIAL YUAN (Nov. 26, 1993), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/ 
p03_01.asp?expno=328.  
 54. These agreements are: Agreement on the Use and Verification of Certificates of 
Authentication Across the Taiwan Straits; Agreement on Matters Concerning Inquiry and 
Compensation for [Lost] Registered Mail Across the Taiwan Straits; Agreement on the 
System for Contacts and Meetings between the SEF and the ARATS; and Joint Agreement 
of the Koo-Wang Talks. Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang, supra note 23, at 28–36 (alteration in 
original) (collecting translated versions of the agreements). 
 55. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 329, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 
JUDICIAL YUAN (Dec. 24, 1993), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/ 
en/p03_01.asp?expno=329. 
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laws, the ROC is an independent state which has never surrendered 
sovereignty over Mainland China. Therefore, we may conclude that 
the ROC Constitutional amendments of 1991 do not deny the PRC’s 
rule on the Mainland Area and confine the ROC Constitution’s 
effective application to Taiwan. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law may not be directly applicable to cross-strait 
relations, but it does provide useful references for consideration. This 
section reviews the experience of post World War II intra-German 
relations and analyzes the applicability of the international law of 
recognition and non-recognition to the cross-strait relations.  
A.  Intra-German Relations 
While post-1949 cross-strait relations are in some ways quite 
different from the experiences of post-war Germany, in both cases 
the two competing parties were described as “divided States.”56  
On the question of the legal status of Germany after World War 
II, but prior to German unification,57 one opinion in West Germany 
held that the German state has never ceased to exist after the 
unconditional surrender in 1945, and that the Federal Republic of 
Germany was the rightful heir to the German Reich and therefore did 
not constitute a new West German state. This position could be 
interpreted as the “identification theory.” 58  On the other hand, 
statements made by the Government of West Germany assumed that 
both East and West Germany were merely artificial legal entities that 
 
 56. E.g., Yung Wei, From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”: A New 
Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS 
SER. CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., no. 1, 1998.  
 57. The two most important documents on German unification are the Treaty on the 
Establishment of German Unity, F.R.G.-G.D.R., Aug. 31, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 457 and Treaty on 
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-20 
(1990). See also Timothy Kearley, German Division and Reunification, 1944-1990: An 
Overview Via the Documents, 84 LAW LIBR. J. 1 (1992) (identifying the most important 
documents regarding post-war Germany’s legal status, especially those most directly 
concerning sovereignty and division). 
 58. See generally Bruno Simma, Legal Aspects of East-West German Relations, 9 MD. J. 
INT’L L. & TRADE 97 (1985). 
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existed within the continuing legal person of the German Reich. This 
position could be named the “roof theory.”59  
A different legal theory prevailed in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). At first, the GDR Constitution stated that East 
Germany was a continuation of the pre-war German Reich. In 1952, 
East Germany changed its policy and claimed that the Reich had been 
dissolved when Germany was divided and there were two competing 
German states.60  
In order to uphold its legitimacy, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) isolated the GDR from 1955 to 1969 based upon the 
Hallstein Doctrine, by which the FRG would not establish or 
maintain diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the 
GDR.61 Since 1969, the new doctrine of Ostpolitik, i.e., reconciliation 
between West Germany and East Germany, had replaced the old 
Hallstein Doctrine. And since 1972, the Basic Treaty regulated 
relations between the FRG and GDR.62  
In the Basic Treaty, the FRG and the GDR agreed to strive to 
develop friendly relations. In order to avoid according full de jure 
recognition to the GDR, the FRG used various common phrases 
instead of legal jargon to leave more room for different 
interpretations of the FRG and the GDR. For example, borders 
between the FRG and GDR would be “respected,” not 
“recognized;” 63  both set up “permanent missions” instead of 
“embassies” in each other’s “government seats,” rather than 
“capitals;”64 and the Federal Office of the Chancellor handled GDR 
Mission affairs by the FRG, instead of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.65  
Although in related documents the FRG stated that it would still 
work for the unification of Germany, after the conclusion of the 
 
 59. See Georg Ress, Germany, Legal Status After World War II, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 567, 572–73 (1995) (describing the theory of identification and 
of the related “roof theory”). 
 60. Rudolf Bernhardt, Unification of Germany, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 59, at 590, 592. 
 61. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 62. Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic (Basic Treaty), F.R.G.-G.D.R, Dec. 21, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 16 
(1973). 
 63. See Tan Shaocheng, supra note 18 at 23. 
 64. Id. at 21. 
 65. Id. 
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treaty it became impossible for the FRG to deny that the GDR is a 
state and a legal subject according to international law. From a legal 
point of view it can be concluded that the Federal Republic 
recognized the GDR as a state under public international law.  
In 1973, when the Bavarian government challenged the 
constitutionality of the Basic Treaty, the Federal Constitutional Court 
of the FRG held that under the treaty the German Reich continued to 
exist and that relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR 
are considered to be of a “special” nature. The two German States 
were not foreign countries with respect to their bi-lateral relations.66  
The Basic Treaty model 67  is inapplicable to the cross-strait 
relations because the two sides of the Taiwan strait have overlapping 
sovereignty claims over each other’s territories.68 These sovereignty 
issues are among the most complex problems related to cross-strait 
relations. Despite this, two lessons can be learned from the German 
case. First, the Basic Treaty is an interesting precedent regarding the 
distinction between sovereignty and the authority to govern due to the 
word “sovereignty” being replaced by the word “supreme power” in 
the Basic Treaty.69 Second, Chancellor Brandt defined the GDR as a 
“special area,” and West-East German relations were “special 
relations.”70 A similar approach was taken in developing the concept 
of mutual non-denial to apply in cross-strait relations. 
B.  The International Law of Recognition  
In the international legal system, the issue of whether an entity is a 
state, or whether a government can be said to represent a particular state 
cannot be determined by a centralized authority. Therefore, the decision 
is left to individual states to determine through their respective systems 
of recognition, i.e., “the acknowledgment by the government of a State 
 
 66. See Ress, supra note 59, at 573. See also THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND 
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 405 (Gunther Doeker & 
Jens Bruckner eds., 1979) (summarizing the case). This treaty helped the admission of both 
East and West Germany to the United Nations. 
 67. In the case of Korea, from the very beginning each of the two Korean Governments 
claimed to represent the whole of Korea, but the consolidation of the factual situation over 
the years has led to a wide recognition of the existence of two Korean States. Of course, to 
both Korean States, this situation is considered provisional. Today, many states have 
diplomatic relations with both. As for international organizations, both states are members of 
the United Nations. For a description of Korea, see Denise Bindschedler-Robert, Korea, in 
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 202–08 (1990). 
 68.  See supra Part II.B. 
 69. See Ma Ying-Jeou, supra note 1. 
 70. See Tan Shaocheng, supra note 18, at 11. 
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of the existence of a newly emergent State, or a new government 
emerging irregularly within an existing State, or of the existence of an 
insurgent party within a State exercising belligerent right.”71 
International law sets forward some criteria for determining 
recognition of a state or a government. For example, section 201 of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
defines a state as: “an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and 
that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with 
other such entities.”72  As to whether a government can represent a 
particular state in the international community, some argue that the 
decisive legal standard is whether an entity effectively controls the 
territory of the state and its population.73 Other authorities like 1991 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
Declaration, suggest that domestic legitimacy does matter.74  
Based upon the above understanding, recognition of states or 
governments should be only to verify a factual situation and should 
not signify either approval or disapproval of the recognized state, its 
government or policies.75 However, the practice of most states shows 
that the law of recognition is a highly politicized part of public 
international law.76 A classic case is the ROC on Taiwan. If one applies 
the factors listed in the Restatement (Third) to the case of the ROC, 
then its recognition problem can be readily resolved. The ROC is in 
effective control of an area of 35,981 square kilometers (14,000 square 
miles) and has a population of approximately 23 million.77 Countries in 
the world should thus recognize the ROC as a state, regardless of the 
status of cross-strait relations, because recognition has nothing to do 
 
 71. JOHN P. GRANT & J. CRAIG BARKER, PARRY & GRANT: ENCYCLOPÆDIC DICTIONARY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 502 (3rd ed. 2009). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 
(1986). See also Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 
165 L.N.T.S. 19 (“The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) a 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.”). 
 73. For a summary of the various views on recognition of government See LORI F. 
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 348–64 (5th ed. 2009). 
 74. See generally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], 
Declaration of the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the 
Former Soviet Union, 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992). 
 75. Id. 
 76. I.A. Shearer, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (11th ed. 1994); Malcolm N. Shaw, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (6th ed. 2008).  
 77. See CIA, Taiwan, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/tw.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
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with the domestic structure or policy of the recognized state. 
Unfortunately, the reality is quite different. The ROC is not recognized 
by most countries and is not represented in the United Nations and its 
affiliated agencies.78 No country has so far been able to recognize and 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC government without 
severing diplomatic relations with the ROC government.  
Professor Chiu took the following position on the status of Taiwan 
in a Congressional hearing: 
According to international law, “the existence in fact of a 
new state or a new government is not dependent on its 
recognition by other states.” (Hackworth, Digest of 
International Law, Vol. 1 (1940), p. 161. Hackworth was 
Chief Legal Adviser of the Department of State and later 
served as a judge of the International Court of Justice.) This 
principle also finds support in the 1933 Inter-American 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States which provide[s] 
in Article 3 that “the political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by other states.” While the United 
States may not want to formally recognize the ROC even as a 
state and government within the territory under its control, it 
may take a position somewhere in between recognition and 
non-recognition with respect to the international status of the 
ROC in Taiwan.79 
This view reflects practices that informal relations have 
sometimes been maintained between a state and an unrecognized 
regime.80 For example, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations 
Act to treat Taiwan as a state and the governing authorities there as a 
government.81  
In view of the above introduction on recognition, one could easily 
conclude that by definition, the international law of recognition of states 
 
 78. See G.A. Res. 2758, supra note 12, at 2. See also Hungdah Chiu, Rong-jye Chen & 
Tzu-Wen Lee, Contemporary Practices and Judicial Decisions of the Republic of China 
Relating to International Law [1979-81], 1 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 141, 142–
43 (1981) (regarding the ROC’s seats in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation). 
 79. Hearings on S. 245, A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States Through 
the Maintenance of Commercial, Cultural, and Other Relations with the People on Taiwan on 
an Unofficial Basis, and for Other Purposes Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th 
Cong. 820 (1979) (statement of Professor Hungdah Chiu). 
 80. See 1 GREEN HAYOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 53 (1940).  
 81. See Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 15 (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. § 3301–16 (2006)). 
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could not be applied to cross-strait relations. Also, unlike the Hallstein 
Doctrine,82 the mutual non-denial approach does not attempt to enforce 
against Mainland China a unilateral regime of non-recognition. Mutual 
non-denial is a formula that while the ROC does not formally 
recognize the PRC in the Chinese mainland under its control, it takes a 
position somewhere in between recognition and non-recognition of the 
PRC.  
CONCLUSION 
The importance of mutual non-denial has been acknowledged by 
some acclaimed international law scholars who observed its mention 
in the 2008 Taiwan presidential campaign.83 Since then, mutual non-
denial has been adopted by the ROC and PRC governments to 
achieve peace and stability in cross-strait relations. 
Mutual non-denial has implications for Taiwan, Mainland China, 
and other states. The international law of recognition is useless to 
resolve the Taiwan question. Under the ROC’s constitution, cross-
strait relations do not constitute international relations. In contrast to 
the two Germanys during the Ostpolitik era in the 1970s, for the 
foreseeable future, the ROC and the PRC can never officially 
recognize each other as a state.  
On the other hand, under mutual non-denial, each side of the 
Taiwan Strait does not deny other’s de facto existence in bilateral 
relations, thereby effectively shelving the sovereignty issue and 
leaving room for negotiations. Cross-Strait talks have proved to 
substantially reduce confrontation and tension and facilitated peace 
and prosperity between Taiwan and Mainland China. 
Therefore, “mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual 
non-denial of authority to govern” is an effective approach to a 
uniquely complex and sensitive cross-strait relationship.  
 
 
 82. Grant, supra note 21, at 223–25.  
 83. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 73, at 343.  
